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THE RESTATEMENT OF THE CO:aThION LAW BY THE
MIERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
T HE organization of the American Law Institute grew out ofdiscussions at the annual meetings of the Association of
American Law Schools. These discussions began more than ten
years ago. The teachers of law composing that .Association had
become increasingly impressed with the growing complexity and
uncertainty of the common law. The thousands of new decisions
annually added to our already bursting storehouses of learning
were making it continually more difficult to understand, to state,
and to teach the common law. To the same extent and for the
same reasons the work of the practicing lawyer in'advising clients
and the work of the judges in deciding cases were becoming in-
creasingly difficult. Necessarily, this situation was reflected in the
published opinions of the judges. Uncertainty of mind produced
confused reasoning and actual conflict in decision. Legal termin-
ology, always shifty and inexact as in the case of all the other
branches of social science, became more and more inefficient in
obtaining clarity of expression and more unsatisfactory to every-
body concerned, as the strain upon it was increased by the rapidity
and complexity of modern life.1
Largely for the foregoing reasons, doubts began to be expressed,
both by the public at large and by thoughtful members of the legal
profession, that our judicial organization and our system of law
were rendering adequate service to the community. In law school
faculties there was much agitation for the study of jurisprudence
in all its phases, particularly as regards legal analysis and termin-
ology. It was believed that there is a science of jurisprudence and
that law schools should be places for its development, and not mere-
ly professional training schools. The organization of a national
school of jurisprudence was proposed a number of times; and one
ill-starred attempt, wholly outside of the Law School Association,
was made to organize an academy for the creation of a modern
Corpus Juris.
1 That uneertainty may also a-nst under a eodified system of law, see Wurzel,
9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 304, who says: "If the faet of uneertainty is
to be seen in all its nakedness, one has but to observe the guessing proeess that
goes on regarding the deeisions of our eourts of last instanee."
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At a meeting of the Association held in December, 1921, a resolu-
tion was adopted directing the appointment of a committee, with
power to associate others with themselves, "for the purpose of
jointly creating a permanent organization for improvement of the
law. " The committee thereafter appointed brought together a
group of about forty men, meetings being held in May and June,
1922. The work of this group resulted in the organization of the
American Law Institute at a large meeting in Washington held in
February, 1923.2
At the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools that
authorized the formation of "a permanent organization for im-
provement of the law," an address in support of the resolution
was made by Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, of New York. In that
address he stated the benefits to be expected from such an organ-
ization as follows:
"You have provided here for the bringing together of all the
forces that are at work in the making of the law-the Universities,
the Bench, and the Bar: That, it seems to me, is a fine thing, a
thing so fine and so useful that of itself it justifies this project. I
hear around me on all sides an insistent demand that the work of
the universities shall be supplemented by the work of the men who
deal with the law in action, the men in the thick of the fight, the
lawyers and the judges. There is a distrust of mere theory. The
last speaker showed that there was the same distrust in Canada.
At all events, I find it here; and the result has been to deny to
scholarship its just meed of recognition and respect. I feel at
liberty to sp'eak with candor about this because I do not share the
distrust myself; and so, in speaking as I do, I am playing, not the
critic, but merely the observer and reporter. Now, in this proposed
Academy you are bringing all these agencies together and inviting
them to act in unison. That, it seems to me, in itself, is a great and
useful work, a work that will co-ordinate and unify many forces
that are acting now in isolation and antagonism. We are to substi-
tute for the attitude of mind, the temper, that spends itself in hos-
tility and distrust, the attitude and temper of mutual helpfulness,
of willing co-operation, a fusion of diverse types and capacities and
attainments. Of course, in such a process there are losses as well
as gains. Sometimes one has to scrap the things that one would
like to keep. One's pet hobbies are sometimes derided, and one's
dearest formulas rejected. One who sits in an Appellate Court,
with the necessity of convincing or placating sh: minds or more,
becomes finally more or less inured to these scenes of carnage and
mutilation. But in exchange one gains other things that mitigate
2 1 Am. L. rust. PrOll., Pt. 2.
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the sacrifice. One gains a fusion of points of view; a balance, a
moderation, and above all, a prestige and an authority that could
not otherwise be won.
"Do not underrate, I beg you, the power that such an Academy
will exert with the passage of the years. Those who begin by scof-
fing will end by paying the tribute of adherence and applause.
Little by little, if such an Academy arises, it will establish a back-
ground, an atmosphere more pervasive than you think. And it
will be true, perhaps, of this atmosphere, as it is of the air we
breathe, that many who are not conscious of its presence will none
the less inhale it and gain its vital force. "3
Elihu Root was the chairman of the large committee that organ-
ized the Institute and outlined the work of restatement of the law
that is now in process. In presenting the report of this committee
to the large national meeting at Washington that organized the
Institute in 1923, Mr. R()ot gave reasons for attempting a restate-
ment of the substantive common law. He commented on the "in-
creasing complexity and confusion of the substantive law," just as
the members of the Association of American Law Schools had for
some years been commenting. As to this he said:
"It was apparent that the confusion, the uncertainty, was grow-
ing worse from year to year. It was apparent that the vast multi-
tude of decisions which our practitioners are obliged to consult was
reaching a magnitude which made it impossible in ordinary prac-
tice to consult them. It was apparent that whatever authorit3r
might be found for one view of the law upon any topic, other
authorities could be found for a different view upon the same topic.
The great number of books, the enormous amount of litigation, the
struggles of the courts to avoid too strict an application of the rule
of stare decisis, the fact that the law had become so vast and com-
plicated that the conditions of ordinary practice and ordinary
judicial duty made it impossible to make adequate examinations-
all these had tended to create a situation where the law was becom-
ing guesswork.' '4
3 Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Proc., December, 1921.
41 Am. L. Inst. Proc., 48. In an article making an argument against codi-
fication, ".A. Century of Judge-Made Law," 7 Col. L. Rev. 453, 457 (1907),
Wm. B. Hornblower said: "This vast mass of decisions is appalling and
one is inclined to welcome any scheme which promises relief to the bewildered
practitioner. ' ,
In 1894 John F. Dillon wrote: "This colossal body of case-law is wholly
unorganized. ., The infinite details of this mountainous mass in its exist-
ing shape-bear me witness, ye who hear me-no industry can master and no
memory retain. " .As we attempt to survey it we are reminded of the dread
and illimitable region described by Milton where "Chaos umpire sits, .And
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Mr. Root further proceeded to express his views as to the char-
acter of the restatement and the effect that it might be expected to
have in eliminating uncertainty and confusion. These were, in
part, as follows:
"Now, if you can have the law systematically, scientifically stat-
ed, the principles stated by competent men, giving their discussions
of the theories upon which their statements are based, giving a
presentation and discussion of all the judicial decisions upon which
their statements are based, and if such a statement can be revised
and criticised and tested by a competent group of lawyers of
eminence, and when their work is done if their conclusions can be
submitted to the bar that we have here, if that can be done when
the work is completed, we will have a statement of the common law
of America which will be the P1-i'l1UL facie basis on which judicial
action will rest; and any lawyer, whose interest in litigation re-
quires him to say that a different view of the law shall be taken,
will have upon his shoulders the burden to overturn the statement.
"Instead of going back through ten thousand cases it will have
been done for him; there will be not a conclusive presumption but
a practical prima facie statement upon which, unless it is over-
turned, judgment may rest.
"If such a thing is done it will tend to assert itself and to con-
firm itself and to gather authority as time goes on. Of course it
cannot be final, for times are continually changing and new condi-
tions arise, and there will have to be revision after revision; but
we will have dealt with the past and will have gotten this old man
of the sea off our shoulders in a great measure."
:L\f.ore than sL't years have now gone by since the Institute was
organized. To what degree is it realizing the hopes of its founders 7
Does the work already done afford new ground for expecting future
accomplishment? Do the already published fragments of a general
restatement of the common law give promise of becoming "the
prima facie basis on which judicial action will rest" and of reduc-
ing the existing uncertainty and complexity 7
Some of the benefits that were expected from the organization of
the Institute and from its attempt to restate the common law are
certainly being attained. In the quotation printed above, Judge
Cardozo said that the Institute would bring together" all the forces
that are at work in the making of the law-the Universities, the
Bench, and the Bar." The experience of six years has already
shown that this is true in some degree, although the three forces
by decision more embroils the fray By which he reigns." 1 Essays in Anglo-
American Legal Rist. 512.
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mentioned by the learned judge are far from being all the forces
that are influential in law making. While the work of drafting
the Restatement is very largely the work of university professors,
the drafts that they produce are constantly subjected to the crit-
icism of members of the Bench and Bar. This occurs to some ex-
tent in thecomnrittees that prepare the drafts, and to a further
extent in the Council of the Institute and in the annual meetings
at Washington. There is no doubt that as time goes on the work
of the Institute will afford increasing opportunity for this co-
operation of the three forces named. Within the committees active-
ly engaged in drafting the Restatements there is a most unusual
opportunity for co-operation and mutual education. Some of the
committees, largely composed as they are of men from different
law schools, have already succeeded in abandoning the "temper
that spends itself in hostility and distrust" and in sub&tituting
the "temper of mutual helpfulness, of willing co-operation, a fusion
of diverse types and capacities and attainments." Law professors
here get some of the education that Judge Cardozo tells us is the
constant lot of the appellate judges. "Pet hobbies" and "dearest
formulas" that have been rammed down the throats of helpless
students in a class room must now compete for their lives and shed
their sacred blood amid "scenes of carnage and mutilation. " What-
ever may be the merits or demerits of the Restatements thus far
prepared, the making of them has been a necessary process in the
creation of better things; it is doing much to "establish a back-
ground" and to create an "atmosphere" that may enable our
successors to climb the heights we do not reach.
Thus far, the committees of the Institute have prepared Re-
statements of large parts of the fields of Contracts, Conflict of
Laws, Agency, and Torts; and much work has been done in Proper-
ty and Trusts. In addition, a Code of Criminal Procedure, con-
sisting of 296 sections with extended commentary, has been sub-
mitted to the Institute. The present writer cannot pass judgment
on the merits of these various documents: first, because he would
not pose as a competent expert in more than one of the fields men-
tioned; and secondly, because in the one field in which he might
regard himself as competent, he assisted in the preparation of the
documents to be appraised. The Restatements are in large part still
in the course of revision; and any criticism or suggestion for bet-
terment ought to be sent to the Reporters and Advisers who are
doing the revising. There is no question that the work of the Insti-
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tute is such a great public undertaking that every person having
special knowledge in any :field of law is in duty bound to make a
careful study of the documents that are being prepared in his :field
and to send to the Institute all the criticisms and suggestions that
he thinks to be of importance. There are certain parts of the Re-
statements, however, that may now properly be made the subject
of published criticism and controversy j these parts have been pub-
lished in the form of Official Drafts without any restriction as to
citation as authority or quotation for purposes of criticism and im-
provement.1i
It is proper, however, to consider several questions in the light
of sL>: years of experience in the work of restatement. The :first of
these questions is: Do the United States of America have a com-
mon law that can be restated7 The answer to this requires a brief
statement as to what is meant by "law." If by "law" is meant
an unchangeable rule expressed in words and handed down by
divinity or by some great human law-giver of the past, it is clear
that we have no such law or system of law. Not only do the United
States have no such law or system j neither does the state of Iowa
nor the state of New York have such a law or system. In a com-
paratively recent dissenting opinion, ~fr. Justice Holmes has sug-
gested that there is no "august corpus," no "transcendental body
of law, " no system of "common law" outside of a particular state;
and he thinks it "an unconstitutional assumption of powers" for
a federal court to attempt to declare and apply within any state a
rule of supposed common law that is repudiated by the courts of
that state.6
Ii A criticism, already published by Professor Whittier, will be considered
further on in this article.
6 "Books written about any branch of the co=on law treat it as a unit,
cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeal, from the State
Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and
criticize them as right or wrong according to the writer's notions of a single
theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus,
to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there
were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the
United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what
it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I
think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found.
Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist with~ut some definite authority behind
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The present writer is quite in agreement with :Mr. Justice Holmes
if he means an august corpus of universal and unchangeable rules;
but he is no more able to find such an "august corpus" within the
confines of the state of Iowa than in all of the United States put
together; and he believes that the federal courts are just as fully
authorized to declare and build up common law in the cases proper-
ly arising before them, as are the courts of a single state.1 The
result may occasionally be added conflict; but it is nothing new in
either kind or quality. A stated rule used by either court as a
basis of decision must fight for its life, whether the rule is enunci-
ated by a state court or by the United States Supreme Court.
The common law of the state of Iowa, the law that has been ap-
plied and will be applied to the citizens and the transactions of
that state, is determined by the great multitude of adjudications
in all the courts that have jurisdiction of such citizens and trans-
actions under our complicated governmental organization. In-
cluded therein are the federal courts of the United States, declar-
ing and creating the common law of Iowa by the very same con-
sent and authorization as the Iowa supreme court itself. When
the United States Supreme Court declares and applies the common
law with respect to men and events within the confines of Iowa,
there is "definite authority behind it" and there is no "uncon-
stitutional assumption of power." Each court will no doubt pay
some meed of respect to the decisions and restatements of the other,
occasionally interspersing "scenes of carnage and mutilation;"
and together they will continue to lay the foundation for all the
new restatements of the future.
With respect to what is called the common law, the English and
American courts did not begin with a great body of already crystal-
lized rules. They did not begin even with a set of extremely broad
principles; for if there is any difference at all between a principle
and a rule of law, it lies only in arbitrarily adopted definitions,
making the one a broader generalization than the other. Instead,
the common law as a system is the result of centuries of growth.
it. The co=on law so far as it is enforeed in a State, whether called com·
mon law or not, is not the co=on law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have
been in England or anywhere else." Black & White Taxi & T. Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Ta.-n & T. Co., 276 U. S. 518,48 Sup. Ct. 404 (1928).
1 See "The Common Law and Our Federal .Jurisprudence" by Chief
.Justice von Moschzisker in 74 Pa. Law Rev. 109.
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It has been constructed by hundreds of thousands of decisions in
actual cases. These decisions show a greater or less degree of uni-
formityand consistency. Precedents are in fact followed. History
repeats itself in judicial and administrative conduct, as well as in
political events. The extent of this uniformity and consistency is
such as to make prediction possible, and thus to enable the mem-
bers of the legal profession to earn their living by giving advice in
advance and preventing litigation, as well as by acting as advo-
cates after disputes have arisen and litigation is begun. The com-
mon law consists of this uniformity and consistency in judicial and
administrative conduct. Its rules and principles are statements in
words of this uniformity and consistency. In this fundamental
aspect the common law is no different from the laws that we think
we have discovered in physics or in chemistry. A law is a state-
ment of uniformity in the past sequence of events, based upon the
recorded observation of those events, by the help of which we be-
lieve that we are able to predict the future course of events. This
is true, whether the uniformities that have been observed are uni-
formities in judicial action or uniformities in the conduct of atoms
or planets or suns.
Human observation of events, however, is often inaccurate and
is always incomplete. The stated laws of physics and chemistry
have continually had to be restated in the light of wider observa-
tion and more nearly correct analysis. In the same way and for
exactly the same reasons, we have had a continuous series of re-
statements of the common law, from the very earliest times of
which we have a record down to the present. The work of the
American Law Institute is merely the latest of these restatements;
but instead of its being the restatement of a single jurist or legal
scholar working alone in his closet, it is being prepared by a large
and diversified group of men working through special committees
of jurists and scholars. The efforts of these committees are not re-
stricted to the finding and stating of uniformities of judicial action
within a single state. They are attempting to state the uniformi-
ties that may be found in the judicial action of many courts in all
of these United States.
In this attempt they must assuredly find thousands of instances
in which there is no perfect uniformity of judicial action. They
find variation from the past and conflict in the present. In some
instances the conflict may be so great as to make it impossible for
the Institute to assert the existence of any uniformity-to state a
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rule of law. In other cases of conflict, the Institute may be able to
lay down a rule as representing the prevailing "weight of author-
ity." In rare cases the Institute, with a greater or less degree of
wisdom, is adopting a minority rule, hoping to direct the stream of
decisions in this manner by using its influence and authority in
the judicial community. In this, the Institute is doing no more
than every jurist of the past has individually done when he states
and approves one of two or more competing rules and recommends
its use to the community.
In spite of a high degree of uniformity, of the following of pre-
cedents, of repetition of the past, there has always been also the
element of variation from the past. This variation is at times
ignorant and unintentional. At other times it is the result of a
conscious choice by the judges. Whatever the cause and however
successful or unsuccessful a particular variation may be in satis-
fying human needs and promoting happiness and survival, it must
be taken into account in any restatement of the law. It is this
variation that has caused the long series of restatements in the past
and that must cause a 'continued series of new restatements in the
future. The restatement by the Institute, if well done, may tend
to reduce the amount of ignorant and unintentional variation; it
may reduce, but it cannot and should not prevent, that conscious
variation that is based upon new experience, changing conditions,
and new customs and desires.
Assuming that there is now need for a restatement of the com-
mon law in the form of a system of new generalizations from the
welter of individual decisions, is the Institute sufficiently taking
into account the recent variations already evidenced in court de-
cisions and also the social mores and business practices that are
already ripe for new variations that must inevitably take place7
The answer to this is easy; most certainly the answer is No. Doubt-
less, from the standpoint of the less active members of the Institute,
the production appears to be making very slow progress; but from
the standpoint of an active participant, it seems to be going alto-
gether too fast. No Reporter or Adviser is able to spend more than
a fraction of his time and strength on the work; and while each
section is reasonably sure of several serious discussions and revi-
sions, it is anything but sure of being founded upon a new and
exhaustive examination of the cases. There should be much more
paid assistance and a little less pressure for results. Lawyers,
teachers, and research scholars have an excellent opportunity for
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supplementing and amending the work of the Institute. With re-
speet to some one or more sections, they can collect the court de-
cisions and make a comparative study of them much more exhaust-
ively than is possible to the force now available. On the basis of
this study, new and more accurate generalizations can be drafted.
Thus gradually the hope of 1\11'. Root may be realized that the
Restatement will deserve to be accepted as a sound prima facie
basis for judicial action.
So far as new social mores and business practices are concerned,
there is no research machinery for their discovery. The present
writer believes, however, that if there were such machinery, it
would be iniluential in affecting the Restatement only in very lim-
ited fields. Before this great community for which the Restatement
is being made would be willing to adopt it, its doctrines must have
received approval and application in some litigated case. Ardent
reformers and confident legislators often believe that they are wise
enough to generalize for the future; but experience indicates that
the best way to turn mores into law is to do it piecemeal by the
"molecular motion" of the courts.
This is no argument against research into the economic and social
life around us. Every university law school is, no doubt, already
engaged in it on a greater or smaller scale; and no law school
should be allowed to prepare men for the Bar without being fitted
to engage in it and actually doing so. One of the great functions
of the Institute in the future will be to provide macbjnery for this
research and to make its wheels go round. Those who believe that
certain sections of the Restatement are ancient and out-of-date
rules, should at once get busy and prove it publicly.8 Such work
forms the basis of the new and constant revisions that are to come.
But we should remember that new social mores and business prac-
tices are in general forced upon the attention of our courts about
as soon as they can be described as "prevailing." It is no new or
surprising dogma that custom makes law. As fast as custom can
8 Concerning the proposed Code of Criminal Procedure, .Judge Harry Olson,
of Chicago, speaking at a meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
in December, 1928, said: "I occasionally sit in with a committee in New
York of the American Law Institute who are revising the Criminal Code for
the United States; and we are working on the authorities-what judges have
said, what courts have said-and we are collecting it all. I do it with great
impatience, because I realize that the law upon which the decisions of those
courts were based is often :fifty years behind time."
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safely be turned into law, the courts generally do it; and the Insti-
tute will be willing to recognize it. In general, it is best to trust
to the recent judicial decisions and to the collective wisdom of a
number of selected men. While there is danger that they may not
have the time or industry to collect all the decisions and that they
may not carry the latest mores in their collective bosoms, the danger
involved in stating unadjudicated mores and practices as existing
law would be much greater.
Among the benefits that can already be seen slowly emerging
from the work of the Institute is the development of a greater cer-
tainty and uniformity in legal terminology. If one thing more
than any other has been demonstrated by this co-operative commun-
ity undertaking in making a restatement of the common law, it is
the fact that each jurist and scholar, however eminent and how-
ever accustomed to the writing of law books, is continually sur-
prised and frequently chagrined by finding that his most cherished
and careful generalizations, his dearest formulas, and the legal
verbiage to which he has been most religiously wedded convey no
clear and definite idea to the benighted minds of the judges, law-
yers, and scholars who constitute the other members of the various
committees and the Council of the Institute. But the "scenes of
carnage and mutilation" in the field of language are nearly always
followed by the confession of error and the forgiveness of sin. ' Out
of them there usually emerges a form of expression that is reason-
ably intelligible to all the members of the restating committee.
This is one important step in our eternal struggle for a common
tongue. A black letter statement that is finally adopted may still
be found to be made up of variables and modes of expressions that
may have had their origin on the tower of Babel; but they have
the merit of being the survivors in a struggle with other forms of
expression that almost invariably are worse. The straining for
definiteness and certainty may at times lead the Institute to de-
clare the existence of a uniformity and of a rule of law ,that in
fact does not exist; but at least we are being spared the repetition
of those noble labor-saving devices of the encyclopaedist and the
hack text-writer, such as "some courts hold" and "probably the
better rule is. "
The productions of the Institute should receive constant criticism,
both destructive and constructive, from within the membership of
the Institute and from without. There will be found bad analysis,
classification, and terminology. There will be turgidity and com-
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plexity of style. In places there will be unfilled gaps where the
law should have been stated; and in other places there will be
labored efforts to cover unimportant details and to express every
possible limitation and exception.9 There will be failure to recog-
nize the obsolescence of old rules through disuse by the courts and
to realize the existence of new rules already immanent in the more
recent decisions and in the life around us. The men available may
not be sufficiently expert or sufficiently numerous; and some that
are expert and available may not be enlisted. There are problems
here to be solved and weaknesses to overcome. The German Civil
Code is said to have required twenty-two years for its completion.
It has received high encomiums and severe criticism. As applied
by officials with narrow experience and dull minds, it may at times
result in decisions as harmful as would have been rendered without
it. We may be sure that the Restatement of American Law will
have imperfections and that new ones will develop in the future;
and we should see to it that the American Law Institute is given
immortal life in order to have the machinery constantly at hand
for their correction.
A critical article, admirable in form and spirit, dealing with the
statement of the law as to mutual assent as it appears in the Con-
tracts Restatement, has already been published by Professor Whit-
tier.10 He expresses adverse criticism of some of the sections on
the topic in question. No doubt there are other sections with which
he is not altogether satisfied; and no doubt there are many sections
with which other jurists will :find serious fault. Other critical
o :r.rontesquieu, in his "L'Esprit des Lois," gave us a number of observa-
tions on the manner of making statutes, which are equally applicable to any
restatement of the law made by anybody. Among these observations, are the
following:
I I The style of statutes should 1)e concise.
"It ought to be simple; a direct e~"pression is always more easily understood
than an indirect one.
"It is essential that the words used in a statute should suggest the same
ideas in all men.
I I Statutes must not be subtle; they are intended for people of average power
of understanding.
"When a statute does not need exceptions, limitations, or qualifications,
these ought not to be inserted; such details will create the need for new
details."
10 Clarke B. Whittier, I I The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent,"
17 Calif. L. Rev. 441 (1929).
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articles will be certain to appear; and the effect of the Restate-
ment upon the decision of cases by the courts and upon the formal
opinions of the judges, will soon begin to be apparent. All such
material as this should immediately be collected by the Institute
and put into the hands of its committees of restatement. Not only
should such matli\rial affect the revisions to be made by the present
committees; it should be continually collected and preserved by the
Institute for the use of future revising committees, to whom the
entire Restatement may be periodically referred.
It seems proper for the present writ.er to come to the support of
the existing official draft, by considering a few of the criticisms
made by Professor Whittier. It should not be supposed, however,
that the Reporter and his Advisers have always been in entire
agreement as to the merits of the official draft, either in form or
in substance. That draft is the net result of argument and dis-
cussion. There have been "scenes of carnage and mutilation."
They have become "inured" to these scenes; and, to a sufficient
degree, they have acquired a "moderation" and a "fusion of
points of view" to make them feel justified in submitting the whole
result to the Institute for adoption and for further improvements,
and in assuming such responsibility as appears to be involved in
the titles of Reporter and Adviser.
It was somewhat surprising to find that Professor Whittier at-
tacks "the objective theory" of contract. No doubt it would have
been profitable if this attack could have been made at the personal
conferences of the committee. The present writer is not in any
case speaking for the Reporter or for any other Adviser; but he
feels sure that the Restatement would not be improved by the
adoption of a "subjective" theory of contract, instead of the "ob-
jective" theory. The fundamental reason for this is that the sub-
jective theory is based upon the unprovable assumption that "in-
tention" means something other than manifestation; that it means
a state or condition of something that we are pleased to call a
"mind," as opposed to physical body.u When courts and text-
writers and the Institute speak of "intention" as a fact having
legal operation, they are merely using a common form of e:ll.."})ression
11 The very same difficulty exists when we attempt to determine the "in-
tention" of a legislature or of one legislator. See Kohler, "Judicial Inter-
pretation of Enacted Law," 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 187, 195; Gray,
Nature and Sources of Law, §370.
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to say that certain types of manifestation are operative and that
others are not.
It mayor it may not be wise to use this common form of expres-
sion in Sections 55, 71, and 72. They could have been stated in
terms of manifestation alone, in more apparent harmony with an
"objective" theory. But one who attempts to skate any part of
our law must at many points yield to the necessity of speaking in
the tongue that is in common use, even though it is not as exact
and scientific as he thinks himself capable of making it. A limited
distance in abandoning certain usages he may safely go; the safe
distance for inventing new terms and usages is considerably less.
It is not here being asserted, however, that these three sections do
not betray the influence of a subjective theory of contract. Even
if so regarded, they merely indicate that the objective theory has
its limits; and surely no greater fault can be found than with the
form of statement that agreement in "intention" is necessary, but
that there are exceptions where one party was negligent or where
words have a meaning of which he was not aware.12
Objective manifestations take many forms; they may be oral or
written words, hand motion in the language of the deaf and dumb,
a nod of the head, or other visible bodily movements. Also, they
might conceivably be heart beats or nervous reactions perceivable
only with the aid of some scientist's delicate machine. But if the
truth is that it is by objective manifestation alone that we can af-
fect others, we should not begin a restatement of contract law by
saying that there must generally be a subjective meeting of minds,
an agreement in intention, as differentiated from expression.
The sufficiency of a manifestation to produce a certain legal ef-
12 It seems clear to the writer that the "objective" method is always used
by the courts in interpreting written contracts. The parties are bound by
what they saw, objectively interpreted. The courts do not undertake to dis-
cover what the parties meant, in any subjective sense; and they hold a party
bound by what he said, even though he was not "negligent" in his cllOice of
words. Negligence followed by change of position may work an estoppel;
but negligence in the choice of words is seldom made an issue in the inter-
pretation of a contract. It is far too limited a view of contract to hold that
agreement in subjective intention is necessary except where a 'party is "neg-
ligent. "
Professor Walter W. Cook wrote: "It is fundamental in the law of con-
tracts that a person is bound, not by his real, but by his manifested inten-
tion, i.e., by his intention as manifested to the other party." , 'Agency by
Estoppel," 5 Col. L. Rev. 36 (1905).
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.feet is always a question for judicial determination; this is true
even though the manifestation consists of oral or written words.
Further, what conduct constitutes a sufficient manifestation under
one set of circumstances does not constitute one under another set.
It is believed that, whenever the courts or the Institute say that
intention is the operative fact, the only meaning that is capable of
practical application is that the manifestations that will be oper-
ative are not the same as in other cases.
The con:fl.ict between subjective and objective theories is not a
new oneP It existed in the views of Sir William Anson and Pro-
fessor T. E. Holland. In his work on Contracts, the former wrote:
"Dr. Holland's view (Jurisprudence, ed. 11, p. 258) is that the
law does not require contracting parties to have a common inten-
tion, but only to seem to have one, that the law (must needs regard
not the will itself but the will as expressed.' Our difference may
be shortly stated. He holds that the law does not ask for (a union
of wills,' but only for the phenomena of such a union. I hold that
the law does require the wills of the parties to be at one, but that
when men present all the phenomena of agreement, they are not
allowed to say that they were not agreed. For all practical pur-
poses, our con:fl.ict of view is immaterial. "
In this con:fl.ict of theory the present writer agrees with Holland,
and not with Anson. He £nds that the actual decisions of the
courts can best be explained on the theory of agreement in expres-
sion, rather than agreement in intention. The legal operation of
the words of an agreement depends upon their effect upon other
people, and not upon the state of mind of the party using them.
It was said by Lord Watson:
"The appellant contracted, as every person does who becomes a
party to a written contract, to be bound in case of dispute by the
interpretation which a court of law may put upon the language of
the instrument. The result of admitting any other principle would
be that no contract in writing could be obligatory if the parties
13 See the discussion of "Proof of so-called Mental Facts, especially the
Intention of Parties" by Wurzel in 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 394. He
says: « From the beginning two theories have been conte,nding with each other
and neither has been able to gain a foot of ground. One is the theory of ex-
pressed intention, placing most stress on the declarations the party has actual-
ly made and which, therefore, has an objective existence. The other theory
is that of the real intention. It seeks to discover behind the declaration the
actual psychological processes of which the declaration was the result."
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honestly attached in their own minds different meanings to any
material stipulation.' '~4
In another case it was said by Lord Sumner:
"I dare say few assured have any distinct view of their own on
the point and might not even see it if it were explained to them.
But what they intend contractually does not depend on what they
understand individually. "IG
It is to be observed that Sir William .Anson thought that for all
practical purposes the conflict of view is immaterial. Evidently
he thought that the rules of court action constituting the law of
contracts would be the same and would lead to the same results,
whichever theory as to mutual assent is adopted. There is a ma-
terial difference between a rule of court action and a theory of con-
tract j and it is true that the theory is of importance only as it in-
fluences the substance and application of the rules and as it clarifies
them to the reader. In the present instance .Anson was probably
wrong in thinking that the theory held does not affect the judicial
decisions made. The present writer is confident that the actual
decisions being rendered cannot be explained and their rules re-
stated without making use of the objective theory. There are too
many thousands of cases in which a contractor has been held bound
in accordance with his objective expression, even though he could
convince both a court and a jury that he never had a consenting
mind to the agreement enforced by the court and also that he was
not negligent in his choice of the expressions used.
With respect to the case of the ship "Peerless" which is used as
an illustration under Section 71/6 it is believed that there was no
contract, not because of the absence of a meeting of two hypothet-
ical "minds," but because the objective expressions of the two
parties were not in agreement and did not so identify the subject
matter of the contract as to make it enforceable. In the light of
the surrounding facts, the words used by the two parties might
equally well be taken to express anyone of the following: (1)
agreement to sell the cotton on the October "Peerless" j (2) agree-
ment to sell the cotton on the December "Peerless"; (3) a promise
to sell cotton on the October "Peerless" and a return promise to
14 Stewart v. Kennedy, 15 App. Cas. 108, 123 (1890).
IG Becker v. London Assur. Corp., 117 L. T. 609 (H. L. 1918). See further
Pollock, Contracts (9 ed.) 5.
16 Raffies v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906 (Exch. 1864).
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buy cotton on the December "Peerless"; (4) a promise to sell cot-
ton on the December "Peerless" and a return promise to buy cot-
ton on the October "Peerless." The decision has been explained by
Mr. Justice Holmes on the objective theory, when he said that there
was no contract in this case not because the parties meant different
things, but because they said different thingsP
The present article cannot undertake to deal at any length with
Professor Whittier's objections to the substantive rules laid down
in specific sections, such as 36, 41, and 43-47. No doubt the restat-
ing committee would have been affected in some degree, had his
objections been made face to face during discussion. One's confi-
dence cannot help being affected when he finds that his "pet hob-
bies" are derided and his "dearest formulas" are rejected, by men
who seem in other matters to have a modicum of intelligence, after
he has had unlimited opportunity of oral argument before them.
It is certain, however, that no draftsman will be affected by a crit-
icism that a stated rule is "unsound in principle" when the only
"principle" that is alleged to make the rule "unsound" is one that
the draftsman does not accept. The common law does not have any
substratum of grand eternal principles on which it rests, except
that judicial decision and administrative action should continually
be readjusted to the needs and desires of mankind. Argument from
"principle" almost always involves a subtle begging of the ques-
tion.
It will be interesting to discover how many would be willing to
accept a rule that the revocation of an offer is effective as soon as
the offeror has used "all reasonably possible haste" in starting it
on its way. The justification for holding that the offeree's accept-
ance is operative, even though the revocation by the extraordinar-
ily diligent offeror is lost by an act of God, or for other reasons not
involving any negligence is not received before acceptance, is that
the rule is in operation and is not giving dissatisfaction.18 It may
17 "T)le law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds.
In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their
conduct. If there had been but one 'Peerless,' and the defendant had said
'Peerless' by mistake, meaning 'Peri,' he would have been bound. The true
ground of the decision was not that each party meant a different thing from
the other . . . but that each said a different thing." Holmes, The Co=on
Law, 309.
18 See the following cases in which a revocation was started before any ac-
ceptance: Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U. S. 411, 13 Sup. Ct. 811 (1893); Hen-
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be that the contrary rule would also work reasonably well. There
are plenty of rules of law that might equally well have been other-
wise.
The rule of Dickinson v. Dodds19 stated in Section 42 was limited
by the Reporter to sales of property because some of his Advisers,
not including the present writer, believe that the rule is not '''fund-
amentally sound." The stated rule, therefore, was limited in ac-
cordance with the facts of the only judicial decisions that thus far
support it. It should be observed that there is nothing in Section
42 to prevent a court from applying an exactly similar rule in cases
that do not involve sales of property. This is a good illustration
of a fact that should be insisted upon over and over again. This is
that the Restatement being constructed by the Institute does not
purport to be a closed, perfect and complete system of law. If it is
offered as constituting such a system, it would do tremendous dam-
age to the community but for the fact that the actual decisions of
the courts would promptl~r riddle the pretension so full of holes
that it would cease to obstruct the view. While the present writer
does not agree with all of Professor Whittier's criticisms, his at-
titude toward the Restatement and its use by the courts is exactly
the same. "He hopes that it will not be considered oracular. That
would hamper the growth of the law and establish permanently
some things that should be given further consideration."
The form and character of the Restatement are now sufficiently
established to raise the question as to its effect upon the courts and
upon students of law. It is evident that the Restatement is not a
Code of laws. It does not purport to be imposed upon anybody or .
to constitute a conclusive basis of decision. Therefore, not only
should it not in any serious degree operate to limit the develop-
ment of law in accordance with changing conditions, practices, and
mores; it should not even become the basis of extended commenta-
ries or the subject of textual interpretation. It is materially differ-
ent from the Negotiable Instruments Law, the German Civil Code,
and the Code Napoleon. The continental codes have been severely
·thorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27, revocation mailed several hours before a.c-
ceptance; Stevenson v. McLean, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 346 (1880), revocation tele-
graphed 9 minutes before acceptance and received bnly 12 minutes after ac-
ceptance; Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 344 (1880); Thompson v.
James, 18 Scot. Sess. Cas. (Dunlop) 1. Text-writers on contracts seem to be
uniformly in agreement. See Anson, Pollock, Salmond, Williston, Page.
192 Ch. D. 463 (1876).
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criticized by the sociological jurists of Europe as having led to
much barren textual interpretation, to the narrowing of judicial
minds, to the destruction of "free decision," and to the divorce-
ment of statutory law from the "living law"-the actual prac-
tices of business and sociallife.20 If the practices of a commnuity
come to be greatly disregardful of what the codes say, it may be-
come more important for a lawyer and a business man to lmow the
common practice than to !mow the "law." Such a situation must
frequently lead to great hardship and radical dissatisfaction with
government, unless the courts and executives are wise enough to
modify the printed word by liberal "interpretation" and judicious
fiction.21 The moral sanctions-that is, the expressions of approval
and disapproval by our neighbors--may be sufficient to prevent
many disputes and violent conflicts; but when they fail, there must
20 Professor Lambert rebeis against "the sterile and discouraging methods
of the 1800 '5 which have paralyzed juristic thought in France." 9 Modern
Legal Phil. Series, 251. He says: "No sooner had the Civil Code been
promulgated than observation of the incessant action of juridical evolution
was laid aside for the easier study of legislative texts. Scientific study gave
way to mere commentary. Interpretation was deluded into the belief that the
Civil Code and the few laws which have completed it and modified it would
serve indefinitely to answer all the juridical problems which the practice of
affairs gives rise to each day." With respect to the German Civil Code he
adds: ' 'Codification inlmediately stimulated in Germany the spread of that
narrow and sterile method which during the 1800's had paralyzed the work of
our own 'school of el>.-pounders of the Civil Code.' The already abundant
literature upon the German Civil Code presents a striking sinillarity to those
first products inspired by the French Civil Code."
Alvarez, 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 447, says: "Judges and jurists
have believed that after codification they did not possess the same powers of
interpretation as before under early French law or under Roman law. They
believed that their only function was to apply the strict letter of the law and
to search for the intent of the legislators in cases presenting novel problems,
without a thought whether these new situations were susceptible of the same
sort of regulation as that already provided by legislation. But we have also
seen how, in the course of the 1800's, in spite of a superstitious regard for
the letter of the law they yet tried (timidly, it is true, under the guise of
interpretation) to adjust codified law to the new exigencies of practice, by
rendering it more flexible, by el>.-panding it, or even by creating new rules."
21 Some of the European critics seem to direct their attack merely at the
codified rule as textually interpreted by professorial jurists and not at the
court decisions dealip.g with the living problems of men. They include the
latter in that "living law" for which they yearn. See Lambert, 9 Modern
Legal Phil. Series, 251; Ehrlich, id. 47 ff., distinguishing "lawyers' law"
from "statutory law."
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be appeal to a state organization, anll its action should be of a
kind that gives general satisfaction. If it fails in this, business is
strangled, success in the competition with happier nations is made
impossible, destructive outbreaks and lunatic experiments are sure
to occur. A people is bound to go under in the struggle for ex-
istence if it has not the capacity to perfect an organization so that
its judicial and administrative action is reasonably uniform and in
harmony with the prevailing and deeply approved mores.
It should be observed, however, that this unfortunate situation
may arise not merely from the attempt of a despot to impose his
will upon others or from an ill-judged reception of a foreign code
or system in disregard of the native civilization; it may arise also
because the atoms composing the molecule become unruly, because
the people become too numerous and too varied in their practices
and interests, because there are no "prevailing" and uniformly
approved mores, because the arm of the state becomes palsied with
uncertainty and the guiding hand that leads along the main trav-
eled road to contentment is missing. The work of the Institute is
an attempt to state anew what the practices and customs of this
great and seething community now are, as they are evidenced by
innumerable instances of judicial action at the pin-points of strain
and conflict. It is an attempt to demonstrate and to state in words
the uniformities (the rules) that are to be found in those innumer-
able instances and to make a selection and a recommendation from
among competing rules and practices. It is an attempt to analyze
and classify and define, at a time when such reorganization work
appears to be loudly demanded, and thus supply a guiding hand to
those who may desire guidance in directing the strong arm of the
state.22
Is the attempt likely to be successful7 Will judges be able to
understand the Restatement and be willing to be guided by it7
This is yet to be seen. Judge Cardozo predicted that "those who
begin by scoffing will end by paying the tribute of adherence and
22 Ehrlich, who certainly cannot be justly accused of underestimating the
sociological aspects of law, says: "The codification of the law actually in
force becomes a necessity after the body of lawyers' law has increased beyond
a certain point. Notwithstanding some undeniable drawbacks, such codifica-
tion seems to be advantageous on the whole. By summing up the entire course
of legal development to date, it creates some sort of order out of the chaos of
the law,-which, in the course of time, tends to become an impenetrable wilder-
ness even to the most skillful.' , 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series, 61.
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applause. " But he is himself the presiding judge in a court that
has already refused to apply Section 164 of the Contracts Restate-
ment.23 Elihu Root predicted that we shall have "a statement of
the common law of America which will be the prima facie basis on
which judicial action will rest," and that, while it cannot be final
and there must be revisions, "we will have dealt with the past and
will have gotten this old man of the sea off our shoulders in a great
measure."
During the six years following their statements, these two learned
men must have had some moments of apprehension and strong
temptation to repudiate their predictions; but it may be that they
still have hope. It will always remain open to individual courts
to feel themselves as competent as the Institute to analyze and
elassify and to select among competing rules and practices. A
prima facie basis does not have to be used; but it does not lie in the
mouth of the present writer to say that it will not "gather author-
ity as time goes on."
It has often been said that"taught law is tough law." Will the
Restatement become the taught law~ There may be some hope that
it will. Not that the Restatement will be used as a text to be
memorized and repeated; it certainly ought not to be. But in the
discussion and criticism of judicial decisions, and even in the con-
sideration of social mores and economic theories, when the learned
instructor reports that some courts hold this and some theorists as-
sert that, he must now add that the American Law Institute says
the othe1·.24
23 The New York Court of Appeals declared that Section 164 of the Con-
tracts Restatement does not state the law of New York. Langel v. Betz, 250
N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928). There were previous New York decisions
contra; and the court did not feel ready to overrule these decisions, in order
to be in agreement with the Institute.
24 Professor Lambert has shown that, in their treatment of a codified sys-
tem of law, law professors and co=entators may be far more subject to
criticism than are the judges of the courts. See 9 Modern Legal Phil. Series,
251. Some of his statements are as follows: "Its principal effect has been
to create a chasm that widens each day between the theory of text-writers and
the rules created by judicial decisions. . . The law expounded in class room
and textbooks differs more and more from that applied in the courts. . . On
the one hand we shall have a body of "taught law" ("doctrine"), a system
fallen into disuse, having a merely conventional and fictitious existence; and
on the other hand the rules as applied in the courts, the system which is really
in use."
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There are very many places in the law where economic needs
and social desires are not sufficiently clear to point definitely to one
rule rather than another. In such a case the selection made by the
Institute may well be accepted. In other cases the courts may have
made a false start and then been induced by the doctrine of stare
decisis to camouflage their subsequent contrary decisions by obvious
fiction, confusing terminology, and distinctions without a differ-
ence. A large part of the existing confusion and tIDcertainty is
directly due to these two causes.
In many instances there has been obfuscation of intellect by such
terms as "privity of contract; II and yet the court will render a
just decision in favor of a third party beneficiary by saying that
"the law creates the privity."2fi The House of Lords has been
heard to say that "our law lmows nothing of a jus q1wesit'nm tertio
arising by way of contract, "26 while four years later it gave judg-
ment in favor of a third party on the theory, totally unimagined by
the contracting parties, that the promisee had acted as a "trustee"
for him.27 The New York courts held that a third party could get
no enforceable right unless the promise was to perform an existing
obligation owed to him by the promisee ;28 and then they held that
this requirement was fully satisfied in one case where the promisee.
was the husband of the beneficiary and was causing her enrichment
by buying her a gift of $50,000,29 and also in another case where the
promisee was the rich aunt of the beneficiary and was merely try-
ing to make a donation for her beloved niece's future support.30
In many cases they say that the third party has no legal right un-
less the contract was made intentionally for his benefit ;31 but at
the same time they hold that, when a debtor arranges for the pay-
ment of his debt by another person, he is making the contract not
for his own benefit, but for that of his creditors, thus enabling them
to maintain action.32
2:; Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337 (Mass. 1851).
26 Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Selfridge, [1915] A. C. 847.
27 Les Affreteurs v. Walford, [1919] A. C. 80l.
28 Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877).
29 Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109,52 N. E. 724 (1899).
30 Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233 (1918).
31 Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355 (1877); Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182
(Pa. 1837).
32 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859), followed in numberless cases. In
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In cases of this kind it is possible for the Institute to cut boldly
through the labyrinth of verbiage and build a straight path by
which courts and teachers and students may reach directly and
without difficulty the firm ground to which the courts in the great
majority of cases, after a long struggle in the morass, have actually
already arrived.33
It is possible that laymen and members of the Bar may be led to
expect too much of the Restatement. They may expect simplicity,
where life is itself too complex to permit of simplicity. They may
expect finality, when the truth is that no legislator or jurist has
the capacity to anticipate 01; to control the future. They may ex-
pect near perfection, as a result of what seems to them a mighty
effort of scholars and jurists. These they will not get; and the
ensuing judicial development of the law ought soon to disabuse
their minds of the error. It may still be hoped, however, that they
will get a better systematic statement than they have had before,




Pennsylvania there ·is a line of cases contra to Blymire v. Boistle; these in-
clude Delp v. Bartholomay Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42, 15 Atl. 871 (1888), and
Howes v. Scott, 224 Pa. 7, 73 Atl. 186 (1909).
33 In Schneider v. Ferrigno, 147 Atl. 303 (Conn. 1929), the court was
aided by sections 133 and 135 in holding that a mortgagee could maintain suit
on a promise made by the purchaser of the mortgaged premises to assume and
pay the mortgage debt, even though the promisee was a party who was not
himself bound to pay that debt. "
II
